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INTRODUCTION 
A. Media Storm 
In May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) 
ruled that individuals have a right to ask for the delisting of certain 
search results when their name is used as a search term.1 Never before 
has a CJEU decision triggered such a large-scale response. On both sides 
of the Atlantic, people struggled to make sense of Europe’s shocking 
ruling in Google Spain, also referred to as “the right to be forgotten” 
case.2 Instantly infamous, the ruling has sparked an unprecedented debate 
about the balance between privacy and freedom of expression online. 
Many scorned the ruling, labeling it a menace to the public’s right to 
know and a push for private censorship.3 Others questioned its 
 
 1. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA (May 13, 2014) (ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131. 
 2. Andrew Orlowski, Europe’s Shock Google Privacy Ruling: The End of History? 
Don’t Be Daft, REGISTER (May 14, 2014, 1:43 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2014/05/14/google_eu_ruling/. 
 3. See, e.g., Dave Lee, Google Ruling “Astonishing”, Says Wikipedia Founder Wales, 
BBC NEWS (May 14, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27407017. See also 
Christopher Kuner, The Court of Justice of the EU Judgment on Data Protection and Internet 
Search Engines: Current Issues and Future Challenges, LSE L., SOC’Y & ECON. WORKING 
PAPERS 3 (2015) (Eng.), https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2015-03_Kuner.pdf; 
Christopher Kuner, Google Spain in the EU and International Context, 22 MAASTRICHT J. 
EUR. & COMP. L. 158 (2015); Ann Cavoukian & Christopher Wolf, Sorry, but There’s No 
Online “Right to Be Forgotten”, NAT’L POST (June 25, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
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practicability, both in terms of scale and outcome.4 Supporters of the 
ruling embraced it as a victory for privacy, often adding that the 
detriment to freedom of expression would be minimal in practice.5 Since 
then, media outlets have been reporting avidly on the thousands of 
incoming “forget-me” requests, several of which were reportedly 
authored by convicted criminals and corrupt politicians.6 
B. Internet Law Crossroads 
What makes Google Spain so interesting from a legal perspective is 
that it finds itself at the crossroads of different crucial fields of European 
Union (“EU”) “Internet law”: (1) privacy and data protection; (2) 
freedom of expression; and (3) intermediary liability exemptions.7 First, 
the ruling confirmed the existence of a right to be delisted against search 
engines. In doing so, the CJEU catalyzed the debate on the exact scope 
of the Data Protection Directive 95/46.8 More fundamentally, Google 
Spain is also emblematic of data protection law’s current identity crisis, 
re-evaluating what it means to “control” one’s personal data and how this 
should work in practice.9 Second, the ruling has considerable 
implications for the fundamental right to freedom of expression.10 In a 
world where search engines are the main tool for finding relevant content 
 
http://natpo.st/1VratSw. 
 4. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Is the EU Compelling Google to Become About.me?, 
HARV.: FUTURE OF THE INTERNET BLOG (May 13, 2014), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/2014/05/13/is-the-eu-compelling-google-to-
become-about-me/. 
 5. See, e.g., Europe: 1, Google: 0: EU Court Ruling a Victory for Privacy, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INT’L (May 20, 2014, 6:58 PM), http://spon.de/aeeB5. For a comprehensive overview 
of commentary on the Google Spain ruling, see Julia Powles & Rebekah Larsen, Academic 
Commentary: Google Spain, CAMBRIDGE CODE, http://www.cambridge-
code.org/googlespain.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
 6. See, e.g., Jane Wakefield, Politician and Paedophile Ask Google to “Be Forgotten”, 
BBC NEWS (May 15, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27423527; Kevin 
Rawlinson, “Hidden From Google” Lists Pages Blocked by Search Engine, BBC NEWS (July 
15, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28311217. 
 7. We have discussed each of these areas in more detail elsewhere. See Brendan Van 
Alsenoy, Aleksandra Kuczerawy & Jef Ausloos, Search Engines After ‘Google Spain’: 
Internet@Liberty or Privacy@Peril?, INTERDISC. CTR. FOR L. & ICT (Sept. 6, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2321494. 
 8. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC) [hereinafter Data Protection 
Directive]. 
 9. See Bert-Jaap Koops, The Trouble with European Data Protection Law, 4 INT’L 
DATA PRIVACY L. 250 (2014). For an in-depth discussion of the various rights embedded in 
the term “right to be forgotten” and their embodiment in laws around the world,  see W. 
Gregory Voss & Céline Castets-Renard, Proposal for an International Taxonomy on the 
Various Forms of the “Right to be Forgotten”: A Study on the Convergence of Norms, 14 
Colo. Tech. L.J. 281 (2016).  
 10. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 364/01, art. 11, 2000 O.J. (C 
2000) 1, 11; Convention for the Prot. of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, 
Nov. 4, 1950, C.O.E.T.S. 1. 
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online, any governmental interference in the provisioning of these 
services requires close scrutiny. Third, the ruling also relates to the topic 
of intermediary liability exemptions for online service providers. In this 
regard, search engines arguably suffer from some degree of 
schizophrenia. Google in particular is often eager to present itself as a 
“neutral intermediary.”11 According to this narrative, search results 
merely point to information that is already out there.12 In other contexts, 
Google has presented its search results as deliberately articulated 
“speech.”13 The successful application of both strategies has been 
characterized as “having your cake and eating it too.”14 
That said, this article does not seek to analyze Google Spain from 
all of these angles.15 Neither will this article question the merits of the 
ruling. The discussion begins with the finding that in the EU, data 
subjects do have a right to be delisted vis-à-vis search engines. From a 
practical perspective, exercising the right to be delisted effectively 
resembles the “notice-and-takedown” mechanism for the removal of 
illegal (or illegally published) content. With this in mind, the article 
focuses on the way forward, aiming in particular to elucidate some of the 
practical and procedural issues ensuing from the CJEU’s ruling in 
Google Spain. Specifically, this article examines current and proposed 
measures for content removal and tests them in the delisting context. The 
purpose is to assess whether these measures are helpful to create an 
adequate delisting procedure and advance the discussion on the 
implementation of Google Spain. 
 
 11. For a critical appraisal of the arguments regarding the “neutrality” of search engines 
and their role as “innocent messengers,” see Uta Kohl, Google: The Rise and Rise of Online 
Intermediaries in the Governance of the Internet and Beyond (Part 2), 21 INT’L J. L. INFO. 
TECH. 187, 191–98 (2013). 
 12. Ranking would merely be the output of an algorithm, not a deliberate choice for 
which one should be held accountable. See id. at 195–96. 
 13. The reason being that speech enjoys constitutional protection (particularly in the U.S., 
under the First Amendment), which may shield the operator from certain legal claims. See 
James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L REV. 868, 871 (2014); Allyson Haynes 
Stuart, Google Search Results: Buried If Not Forgotten, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 463, 474 (2014). 
 14. Richard Curtis, Google Says You Can Have Your Cake and Eat It Too, DIGITAL 
BOOK WORLD (May 27, 2012), http://www.digitalbookworld.com/2012/google-says-you-can-
have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too. 
 15. This has been amply done already. See, e.g., Alsenoy, Kuczerawy, & Ausloos, supra 
note 7; Anna Bunn, The Curious Case of the Right to Be Forgotten, 31 COMP. L. & SECURITY 
REV. 336 (2015); Kuner, supra note 3; Orla Lynskey, Control over Personal Data in a Digital 
Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, 78 MOD. L. REV. 522 (2015); Indra 
Spiecker, A New Framework for Information Markets: Google Spain, 52 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1033 (2015). The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law also dedicated a 
Legal Debate to the case in Issue 2014/3 with contributions by Giovanni Sartor, Hielke 
Hijmans, and Christopher Wolf. See Giovanni Sartor, Search Engines as Controllers: 
Inconvenient Implications of a Questionable Classification, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. 
L. 565 (2014). 
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I. HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
A. Google Spain 
1. Facts of the Case 
In the late 2000s, a Spanish citizen Googled his name and found a 
bad memory. Among the first search results were references to decade-
old newspaper announcements advertising the fact that his house was 
being put up for public auction by the Spanish Social Security 
Administration.16 This upset him because the underlying debt had long 
been settled. So the man decided to contact the newspaper and ask for the 
announcements to be removed. The newspaper refused, explaining that it 
was under a legal obligation to publish such information.17 The man then 
requested Google to stop referring to those pages when someone uses his 
name as a search term.18 When he did not receive a positive answer from 
Google either,19 he approached the national data protection authority 
(“AEPD”),20 which issued a decision ordering Google to delist. Instead 
of complying,21 Google appealed to the Audiencia Nacional, which, in 
turn, referred the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
 16. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA para. 14 (May 13, 2014) 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
:62012CJ0131. 
 17. Such publication was mandatory pursuant to an order issued by the Spanish Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs. See A.A.N., Feb. 27, 2012 (No. 725/2010, para. 1.2) (Spain) 
(ECLI:ES:AN:2012:19A), http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/doAction?action=contentpdf 
&databasematch=AN&reference=6292979&links=%22725/2010%22&optimize=20120305&p
ublicinterface=true (text of Audiencia Nacional opinion on appeal from the decision of Spain’s 
data protection authority). 
 18. Id. at para. 1.3. 
 19. The Spanish citizen first contacted Google’s Spanish subsidiary. This subsidiary 
(Google Spain SL) forwarded the request to Google Inc. (U.S.), arguing that this is the entity 
responsible for the development of search results. Id. at para. 1.4; Case C-131/12 Opinion of 
Advocate Gen. Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
CURIA para. 20 (June 25, 2013) (ECLI:EU:C:2013:424), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CC0131 . 
 20. AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS [SPANISH DATA PROTECTION 
AGENCY], http://www.agpd.es/portalwebAGPD/index-ides-idphp.php (last visited Mar. 20, 
2016). 
 21. Arguably, it was a deliberate and strategic decision on Google’s behalf not to comply 
with the AEPD’s injunction. Besides wanting to obtain a more definitive and authoritative 
answer on whether or not these kinds of requests should be possible in the first place, Google 
was probably interested in clarification on who will bear the costs of compliance. Do search 
engines (exclusively) bear the burden of assessing delisting requests? Or can they just defer to 
the authorities (Data Protection Agency or Court) to make the appropriate balance? The CJEU 
seems to suggest a middle way, in which search engines can be asked to make a balance, but 
can easily defer the requester to the relevant national authority in more problematic cases 
without risking liability. Alsenoy, Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra note 7, at 29 n.127. 
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(“CJEU”) for a preliminary ruling.22 
2. Scope 
To the surprise of many,23 the CJEU held that EU data protection 
law does apply to search engines such as Google. More specifically, 
(some of the activities of) search engines fall within the scope of the 
Data Protection Directive.24 Search engines’ responsibilities, however, 
only extend to their own sphere of control, i.e., their own algorithms and 
search results.25 In other words, the ruling does not impose search engine 
liability over the publication of the original content. Instead, the scope of 
application is concentrated on the search engine’s activity of linking a 
specific search term (such as the name of an individual) with a specific 
search result. This operation, after all, is entirely controlled by the search 
engine. 
3. Right to be Delisted 
The CJEU unambiguously ruled that individuals can ask search 
engines to delist specific search results when their name is used as a 
search term.26 It did not rule that search engines can be compelled to 
interfere with the source itself,27 nor that search engines can be 
compelled to delist a search result entirely (i.e., on the basis of any 
search term).28 Whether or not the source material being referred to is 
lawfully published is irrelevant.29 Neither is the data subject required to 
demonstrate harm.30 However, the Court did specify that the right is not 
 
 22. National courts can refer questions to the CJEU on the interpretation of specific 
provisions in EU law. The eventual decision by the CJEU is called a preliminary ruling and 
does not relate to the matter of the underlying case (which is still left to be decided by the 
referring national court). See The Reference for a Preliminary Ruling, EUR-LEX, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1449495495167&uri=URISERV:l14552 (last 
updated Jan. 15, 2014). 
 23. The Court set aside the earlier advice issued by the Advocate General, who 
recommended that the CJEU should not recognize a “right to be forgotten” vis-à-vis search 
engines. See Case C-131/12 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Jääskinen, at para. 133. 
 24. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA para. 41 (May 13, 2014) 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
:62012CJ0131. For an extensive analysis of the territorial scope and reach of the Google Spain 
ruling, see Brendan Van Alsenoy & Marieke Koekkoek, Internet and Jurisdiction After 
Google Spain: The Extraterritorial Reach of the ‘Right to Be Delisted’, 5 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 105 (2015). 
 25. Spiecker, supra note 15, at 1040. 
 26. Such a right would be based on the rights to object and to erasure of the Data 
Protection Directive. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, arts. 12(b), 14. 
 27. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at para. 83. 
 28. Id. at paras. 80, 82, 87–89, 94, 99. 
 29. Id. at paras. 88, 93–94. 
 30. Id. at paras. 96, 99. 
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absolute, and the rights and interests of all parties need to be balanced.31 
The rights and interests at stake include the data subject’s rights, the 
economic interests of the search engine operator as well as the legitimate 
interests of Internet users in accessing information on the basis of a 
specific name search. According to the CJEU, a search engine’s 
economic interests alone cannot justify the respective interference with 
data protection rights. With regard to the balancing of fundamental rights 
and interests of Internet users versus those of the data subject, the Court 
did state that the latter override all others by default.32 This should be 
read in light of the heightened impact search engines have on an 
individual’s privacy and data protection rights.33 As more and more of 
one’s life is logged online,34 search engines are capable of collating 
increasingly detailed biographical pictures. If one searches for an 
individual’s name, the ensuing list of results may offer a (seemingly) 
comprehensive profile of that individual.35 This profile may have a 
profound impact on a person’s reputation, livelihood, and personal 
development. Today, “you are what Google says you are.”36 
4. Balancing 
In the first instance, it is up to the search engine—i.e., the 
“controller”—to perform the required balancing exercise.37 If the search 
engine fails to do so, or denies the request, individuals can approach the 
 
 31. Id. at paras. 74–76. 
 32. Id. at paras. 81, 97. 
 33. Id. at paras. 80–81 (referring to Articles 7 (privacy) and 8 (data protection) in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union). 
 34. For example: a high school graduation, a change in job, participation in a charity 
drive, etc. 
 35. In the CJEU’s words, a search engine: 
[E]nables any internet user to obtain through the list of results a structured 
overview of the information relating to [an] individual that can be found on the 
internet — information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of 
his private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been in-
terconnected or could have been only with great difficulty — and thereby to 
establish a more or less detailed profile of him. Furthermore, the effect of the 
interference with those rights of the data subject is heightened on account of 
the important role played by the internet and search engines in modern society, 
which render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous. 
  Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at para. 80. 
 36. Megan Angelo, You Are What Google Says You Are, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2009, 11:23 
AM), http://www.wired.com/2009/02/you-are-what-go/. See also Meg Leta Ambrose, You Are 
What Google Says You Are: The Right to be Forgotten and Information Stewardship, 17 INT’L 
REV. INFO. ETHICS 22 (2012) (pointing out that much online information is in fact more 
ephemeral than commonly portrayed). 
 37. This balancing exercise, importantly, differs from the one that would have to be made 
when a similar request is directed to the source-page directly. David Lindsay, The ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’ by Search Engines Under Data Privacy Law: A Legal Analysis of the Costeja 
Ruling, 6 J. MEDIA L. 159, 173 (2014). 
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appropriate data protection authority or court.38 As to the balancing 
exercise itself, the CJEU did provide some guidance, including: the 
nature or sensitivity of the information; public interest; role of data 
subject in public life; and time elapsed.39 In any situation, it is important 
to emphasize that the data subject still has to fulfill the conditions for 
exercising his/her right to object/erase.40 Moreover, the search engine is 
only subject to data protection rules “within the framework of its 
responsibilities, powers and capabilities.”41 The role of search engines is 
therefore mainly reactive in nature: they are only obliged to react to 
specific requests. They are not obliged to preventively assess the links 
between search terms and search results in general. 
B. Implementation of Google Spain 
1. Online Form 
Soon after the CJEU’s ruling, Google launched an online form that 
allows individuals to request delisting of search results for queries that 
include their name.42 The page explains that Google will “assess each 
individual request and balance the [privacy] rights of the individual . . . 
with [the] public’s right to know and distribute information.”43 
Individuals are asked to give at least the following information: 
(a) the country whose laws apply to the request; 
(b) name used to search; 
(c) contact email address; 
(d) a proof of identity; 
(e) each uniform resource locator (URL) requested to be delisted; 
(f) an explanation (for each URL) of why the linked web page is 
about the individual; and 
(g) a reason (for each URL) for why this URL is “inadequate, 
irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive.”44 
 
 38. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at para. 77; see also id. at 
171. 
 39. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at paras. 81, 93. 
 40. In order to exercise one’s right to object, the data subject will have to put forward 
“compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing of data 
relating to him.” Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 14. The right to erasure can be 
exercised when the processing in question “does not comply with the provisions of this 
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.” Id. at art. 
12. Put differently, individuals will still have to motivate their requests for delisting. 
 41. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at paras. 38, 83. 
 42. Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch (last visited Mar. 20, 
2016). 
 43. Privacy & Terms FAQ, GOOGLE, https://www.google.be/intl/en/policies/faq/ (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
 44. Id. 
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The form is only available on the local EU member-states’ versions 
of Google (i.e., the EU country code top-level domains and their 
respective national languages).45 Not long after Google did so, Bing46 
and Yahoo!47 put similar forms in place. 
2. Advisory Council 
Google assembled an “Advisory Council” of academics, 
entrepreneurs, and former public officials to provide guidance on how to 
implement the CJEU’s ruling.48 The Council held “public hearings” in 
seven European capitals, where a number of invited persons were given 
the opportunity to deliver testimony and the general audience could ask 
questions.49 The Council’s hearings and discussions eventually 
culminated in a report published in early 2015. Besides providing 
additional criteria to be considered when assessing delisting requests, the 
report also contained procedural suggestions.50 Complementing the 
report, Google also released some numbers on the kinds of delisting 
requests it receives as part of its transparency reporting (see infra, 
Section III.E).51 
 
 
 45. Google’s form can be found by clicking on “Privacy,” then “FAQ,” then “How can I 
remove information about myself from Google’s search results?” Search Removal Request 
Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 42. 
 46. Bing’s form is available on EU versions via its homepage: European Data Protection. 
Request to Block Bing Search Results in Europe, BING, 
https://www.bing.com/webmaster/tools/eu-privacy-request (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). This 
page also provides helpful links to the relevant webpages on third-party social media sites 
where people can control the indexability of their content by search engines. 
 47. Yahoo’s form is available on all local EU versions of Yahoo! via its homepage. 
Requests to Block Search Results in Yahoo Search: Resource for European Residents, 
YAHOO!, https://uk.help.yahoo.com/kb/search/requests-block-search-results-yahoo-search-
resource-european-residents-sln24378.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). 
 48. Jemima Kiss, Google Launches ‘Advisory Council’ Page on Right to Be Forgotten, 
GUARDIAN (July 11, 2014, 9:45 PM), http://gu.com/p/3qpzh/stw. 
 49. For videos of each of these hearings, see Google Advisory Council, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil (last visited Mar. 20, 2016). For a short summary, 
see Brendan Van Alsenoy & Jef Ausloos, Google’s Advisory Council Hearings: Things to 
Remember and Things to Forget, LONDON SCH. ECON.: MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG (Nov. 
7, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/11/07/googles-advisory-council-
hearings-things-to-remember-and-things-to-forget/. 
 50. Concerning, for example, the request form, notification of webmasters, and appeal 
procedures. 
 51. European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE: TRANSPARENCY REP., 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/ (last updated Mar. 21, 
2016). 
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3. Article 29 Working Party 
In November 2014, the Article 29 Working Party (“29WP”)52 
released Guidelines on the implementation of the CJEU judgment on 
Google Spain.53 Besides officially endorsing the terminology “right to be 
delisted,” 29WP provided a non-exhaustive list of balancing criteria.54 
Importantly, the Guidelines clarified that the ruling “does not oblige 
search engines to permanently carry out that assessment in relation to all 
the information they process, but only when they have to respond to data 
subjects’ requests.”55 Such requests are subject to certain conditions and 
relate to the delisting of specific name-based search results only.56 
4. Emerging Body of Case Law 
A pan-European body of case law is emerging, with decisions in 
different jurisdictions explicitly referring to Google Spain.57 In Spain, for 
example, Google has been held liable for moral damages when it did not 
delist results after being ordered to do so by Spain’s data protection 
agency (“DPA”).58 Spanish courts have also reiterated the difference in 
responsibilities between search engines and platforms hosting content.59 
For example, Google was ordered to delist links to its own Blogger 
platform, while at the same time being exempted from having to remove 
the blog posts themselves.60 In at least two instances, Dutch courts have 
emphasized the impact on freedom of expression of delisting requests 
 
 52. The 29WP is an independent EU advisory body composed of all Member State data 
protection agencies. See Article 29 Working Party, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/ (last updated Oct. 6, 2015). 
 53. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González” C-131/12 (Nov. 26, 
2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf [hereinafter 29WP Guidelines]. 
 54. Id. at 12. 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. Jef Ausloos & Brendan Van Alsenoy, Implementing the “Right to Be Forgotten”: 
The Article 29 Working Party Speaks Up, LONDON SCH. ECON.: MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG 
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/12/03/implementing-the-right-
to-be-forgotten-the-article-29-working-party-speaks-up/. 
 57. For a comprehensive, structured overview of different criteria that can be derived 
from European case law and other relevant sources, see infra Appendix. 
 58. S.A.P, July 17, 2014 (R.G.D. No. 364/2014) (Spain). 
 59. For an extensive overview of relevant Spanish case law, see Miquel Peguera, In the 
Aftermath of Google Spain: How the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Is Being Shaped in Spain by 
Courts and the Data Protection Authority, 23 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 325 (2015). 
 60. Google can be considered to be a mere host with regard to the content on the Blogger 
platform. See S.A.N., Dec. 29, 2014 (R.G.D. No. 5252/2014) (Spain); S.A.N., Dec. 29, 2014 
(R.G.D. No. 5254/2014) (Spain); S.A.N, Feb. 17, 2015 (R.G.D. No. 661/2015) (Spain); S.A.N, 
Feb. 24, 2014 (R.G.D. No. 568/2015) (Spain). 
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relating to journalistic content.61 In France, a court ordered Google to 
delist links to information regarding criminal proceedings that, 
meanwhile, had already been removed from the plaintiff’s criminal 
record.62 Just across the border, a Belgian judge ruled that in certain 
cases, the original publisher can also be held responsible for making sure 
content is not listed by search engines such as Google in the first place.63 
Besides courts, DPAs across the EU have received over 2,000 delisting 
requests, including appeals to Google’s decisions.64 The growing volume 
of cases demonstrates there is a clear demand for a right to be delisted in 
practice. Progressively, these decisions should also bring about more 
substantial and substantive guidelines on how to implement the right. 
II. HAVE WE MET BEFORE? 
A. Dazed and Confused: Criticism of Google Spain 
Google Spain immediately became a target of harsh criticism. The 
ruling has been criticized as not paying sufficient attention to the right of 
freedom of expression and failing to answer how it should be balanced 
 
 61. Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Freedom of Expression and ‘Right to 
Be Forgotten’ Cases in the Netherlands After Google Spain, 1 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. 
REV. 113, 113–24 (2015). 
 62. Tribunal de grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Ordonnance de de référé [interim order] Dec. 19, 2014, LEGALIS, http://www.legalis.net/ 
spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=4425 (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
 63. Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeals] Liège, 20e ch. Sept. 25, 2014, 2013/RG/393, 
http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be/view_decision.html?justel=F-20140925-11&idxc_id=283221& 
lang=FR (click “Imprimer”). 
 64. Latest official numbers date from June 2015. See European Commission Press 
Release, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party - Delisting (June 18, 2015). In November 
2015, the UK DPA released statistics on the delisting cases it has ruled on. See David Smith, 
Has the Search Result Ruling Stopped the Internet Working?, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF.: 
BLOG (Nov. 2, 2015), https://iconewsblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/02/has-the-search-result-
ruling-stopped-the-internet-working/. In one noteworthy case, the UK’s Information 
Commissioner’s Office ordered the delisting of links to current news stories reporting on older, 
already delisted stories. However, there seemed to be no apparent reason to mention the 
original complainant’s name again other than having the information re-appear in search 
results on the basis of the person’s name. See Samuel Gibbs, Google Ordered to Remove Links 
to ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Removal Stories, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2015, 11:47 PM), 
http://gu.com/p/4byx3/stw; see also Eerke Boiten, Privacy Watchdog Takes First Step Against 
Those Undermining Right to be Forgotten, LONDON SCH. ECON.: MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT 
BLOG (Aug. 25, 2015), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2015/08/25/privacy-
watchdog-takes-first-step-against-those-undermining-right-to-be-forgotten/. 
  Notably, in March 2016, the French DPA (CNIL) issued a €100,000 fine to Google 
for ignoring an earlier order to delist results globally. Droit Au Déréférencement: La 
Formation Restreinte de La CNIL Prononce Une Sanction de 100.000 € à L’encontre de 
Google, COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTÉS [CNIL] (Mar. 24, 
2016), https://www.cnil.fr/fr/droit-au-dereferencement-la-formation-restreinte-de-la-cnil-
prononce-une-sanction-de-100000-eu. 
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against the rights to privacy and data protection.65 Critics point out that a 
right to be delisted would constitute a vertical inference with the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression.66 Indeed, the way in which 
the ruling was implemented has been heavily criticized from the start. 
Even though the CJEU confirmed the existence of a right to be delisted, 
the Court was largely silent on how it should work in practice. Google’s 
reaction to the ruling,67 and the 29WP Guidelines,68 have only added fuel 
to the fire. The following paragraphs summarize the main criticisms of 
Google Spain. The aim of this section is to compile an inventory of the 
prevailing rhetoric rather than to rebut or embrace any of the arguments 
in particular. 
1. Over-compliance 
The flagship argument of Google Spain opponents relates to the risk 
of over-compliance. Many commentators fear that the ruling would 
incentivize search engines to delist content without any prior 
assessment.69 The main reason is that processing the requests in an 
appropriate manner requires considerable resources (human, financial, 
and technological). A delisting procedure is “a labor-intensive operation 
that offers no obvious source of new revenue.”70 Critics fear that in order 
to facilitate the process and to avoid the extra costs, search engines might 
not investigate the requests adequately. Moreover, a failure to delist 
could potentially lead to liability. The most cautious approach for search 
engines would be to comply with all requests, and skip any (possibly 
burdensome and lengthy) balancing of the rights at stake. Hasty delisting 
procedures can easily lead to over-blocking of legitimate content. 
Overzealous compliance with the requests would hinder the rights to 
freedom of expression and access to information. 
 
 65. See, e.g., Stefan Kulk & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Google Spain v. González: 
Did the Court Forget About Freedom of Expression?, 5 EUR. J. RISK REG. 389 (2014); Steve 
Peers, The CJEU’s Google Spain Judgment: Failing to Balance Privacy and Freedom of 
Expression, EU LAW ANALYSIS (May 13, 2014), 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/05/the-cjeus-google-spain-judgment-failing.html. 
 66. Joris van Hoboken, Case Note, CJEU 13 May 2014, C-131/12 (Google Spain) (Sept. 
14, 2014), (unpublished manuscript) http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2495580; see generally 
JORIS VAN HOBOKEN, SEARCH ENGINE FREEDOM: ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM EXPRESSION FOR THE LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF WEB SEARCH ENGINES (2012). 
 67. Including setting up an Advisory Council to guide the implementation of the ruling. 
See supra Section I.B.2.  
 68. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53. 
 69. See Zittrain, supra note 4. 
 70. Craig Timberg & Michael Birnbaum, In Google Case, E.U. Court Says People Are 
Entitled to Control Their Own Online Histories, WASH. POST (May 13, 2014), 
http://wpo.st/ohWN1. 
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2. Rewriting History 
According to several critics, allowing individuals to request 
delisting of legal and true content could lead to grim results. As 
Cavoukian and Wolf stated, “empowering individuals to demand the 
removal of links to unflattering, but accurate, information arguably goes 
far beyond protecting privacy.”71 Some commentators dramatically 
pointed out that the ruling enables the “rewriting of history”.72 Or worse, 
it converts the right to privacy into “the right to censor,”73 especially 
when made by criminals, corrupt politicians, and the like.74 Search 
engines would no longer present us with an accurate image of the world. 
Instead, search engines would merely give us, what the Advocate 
General called a “bowdlerized” version of facts, stripped of any 
“negative” information.75 It is feared that denying easy access to 
anyone’s inglorious past would have a catastrophic impact on the 
fundamental rights of freedom of expression and access to information.76 
3. Heavy Burden 
A third strand of critique relates to the burden imposed on search 
engine providers. After receiving a delisting request, the search engine 
must assess its merits. This includes evaluating the nature of the source 
content and balancing the different rights/interests at stake (see 
Appendix). With the ruling, the CJEU “has mandated that the Googles of 
the world serve as judge and jury of what legal information is in the 
public interest.”77 Resolving conflicts of rights between individuals 
requires a good amount of legal knowledge (and resources).78 Deciding 
 
 71. Cavoukian & Wolf, supra note 3. 
 72. Timberg & Birnbaum, supra note 70. 
 73. Cavoukian & Wolf, supra note 3. 
 74. Index Blasts EU Court Ruling on “Right to be Forgotten”, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 
(May 13, 2014), https://www.indexoncensorship.org/?p=57446; David Streitfeld, European 
Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1iHQwPH. 
 75. Case C-131/12 Opinion of Advocate Gen. Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA para. 131 (June 25, 2013) (ECLI:EU:C:2013:424), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CC0131. 
 76. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012) 
(claiming that it represents the biggest threat to free speech on the Internet in the coming 
decade). See T.J. Raphael, Should We Have a ‘Right to be Forgotten’ on the Net?, PRI: 
TAKEAWAY (May 13, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-05-13/should-we-
have-right-be-forgotten-net; Matt Ford, Will Europe Censor This Article?, ATLANTIC (May 13, 
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/europes-troubling-new-right-
to-be-forgotten/370796/. 
 77. Cavoukian & Wolf, supra note 3. 
 78. To be fair, few people doubted that Google had the capacity to efficiently implement 
a delisting procedure. After all, Google (and other search engines) has been operating a 
takedown mechanism for copyrighted content for years. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, 
Omission of Search Results is Not a ‘Right to be Forgotten’ or the End of Google, GUARDIAN 
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on conflicts of interests in the copyright context is already considered a 
thorny issue.79 Balancing privacy and data protection rights against the 
right to freedom of expression arguably requires an even more careful—
and burdensome—assessment. 
4. Private Actors Make for Bad Judges 
Another concern relates to the role of search engines as arbitrators. 
The ruling raised the question whether private entities should be asked to 
decide on conflicts of rights. In democratic countries, such role is 
traditionally reserved for the judiciary.80 Transferring judicial power to 
the private sector could, at the very least, be considered inappropriate; 
especially when fundamental human rights are involved.81 
5. Due Process 
Google Spain not only affects the right to access information but 
also the right to impart information. Critics stress that the ruling fails to 
consider the interests of online publishers.82 After all, the decision to 
delist affects the visibility of publishers’ content.83 Moreover, the ruling 
does not prescribe any involvement of publishers in the delisting process 
(e.g., through consultation, notification and/or appeal mechanisms). A 
publisher might not even realize that the findability of its content has 
been affected. Consequently, the ruling has been criticized for 
 
(May 13, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://gu.com/p/3p7pc/stw. 
 79. For example, assessing the fair use exception is still problematic. See Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Brian Focarino, Dancing Baby 
Center of Test Case over Bad DMCA Takedown Requests, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 21 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/21/dancing-baby-test-case-over-dmca-takedown-
requests/id=61746/. 
 80. See EU Court ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Threatens Freedom of Expression, 
GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE (May 15 2014, 11:38 AM), 
https://globalnetworkinitiative.org//news/eu-court-%E2%80%98right-be-forgotten%E2%80 
%99-ruling-threatens-freedom-expression; Heather Greenfield, CCIA’s Response to European 
Court of Justice Online Privacy Ruling, COMPUTER & COMM. INDUSTRY ASS’N (May 13, 
2014), https://www.ccianet.org/2014/05/ccias-response-to-european-court-of-justice-online-
privacy-ruling/. 
 81. See Van Alsenoy & Ausloos, supra note 49. See also Summary of the Results of the 
Public Consultation on the Future of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market and the 
Implementation of the Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC), EUR. COMM’N 12 
(2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/e-commerce/summary_ 
report_en.pdf. 
 82. In this paper we use the term “publisher” in a broad sense to refer to all parties that 
contribute to creation and dissemination of content online, such as authors, news publishers, 
bloggers, social media platforms, etc. 
 83. See Right to Be Forgotten: With Free Expression Under Threat, Europe Needs a 
‘Marco Civil Moment’, GLOBAL VOICES (Sept. 11 2014, 5:45 PM), 
https://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/09/11/right-to-be-forgotten-with-free-expression-under-
threat-europe-needs-a-marco-civil-moment/. 
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disregarding the right to due process. Limiting one’s right to impart 
information without ensuring proper defense mechanisms is not a 
standard worth following. 
The criticism expressed in the wake of Google Spain overlaps to a 
great extent with the line of arguments used in the debate on blocking 
and removing illegal content online.84 The apparent overlap between 
delisting and so-called “notice-and-takedown” procedures warrants a 
closer look at the latter. The lessons learned in the ongoing discussions 
on notice-and-takedown could inform the development of procedural 
safeguards in the context of the right to be delisted. 
B. A Hint of Déjà-Vu? 
The notice-and-takedown mechanism was designed to help 
eliminate illegal (or illegally published) content from the Internet.85 In 
order to be efficient, the mechanism co-opts Internet intermediaries to 
keep the Internet “clean,” when called upon by rights holders.86 Upon 
receiving a notice, intermediaries must make a swift decision whether to 
remove content, block access, or ignore the complaint. In the latter case, 
the intermediaries risk becoming liable for facilitating the infringement 
by the third party. Involvement of public authorities is neither excluded 
nor required. 
In the EU, the notice-and-takedown mechanism originates from E-
Commerce Directive 2000/31.87 The E-Commerce Directive has a 
horizontal nature, meaning that it covers various types of illegal content 
and activities (infringements on copyright, defamation, content harmful 
to minors, unfair commercial practices, etc.) and provides immunities for 
different kinds of liability (criminal, civil, direct, indirect).88 A similar 
mechanism exists in the United States but is limited to copyright 
infringements under The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”).89 Despite obvious similarities between the EU and the U.S. 
 
 84. See Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra note 7, at 44. 
 85. For a history of the intermediary liability regimes and the “notice-and-takedown” 
procedures, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES IN ADVANCING PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES (2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/48685066.pdf. 
 86. See, e.g., A Clean and Open Internet: Public Consultation on Procedures for 
Notifying and Acting on Illegal Content Hosted by Online Intermediaries, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/clean-and-open-internet_en.htm (last 
updated Dec. 3, 2015). 
 87. Parliament & Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) [hereinafter E-
Commerce Directive]. 
 88. FLORENCE LE BORGNE-BACHSCHMIDT ET AL., IDATE CONSULTING, USER-
CREATED-CONTENT: SUPPORTING A PARTICIPATIVE INFORMATION SOCIETY 220 (2008), 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/233. 
 89. In the United States, liability of online intermediaries is governed by two provisions 
of federal law: Section 509 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) (codified at 47 
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mechanisms, the E-Commerce Directive lacks the safeguards provided 
for in the DMCA. These safeguards include a clear procedure for 
removal and replacement of content (put-back procedure), requirements 
for a valid notice and counter-notice as well as penalties for 
misrepresentations.90 Unlike the DMCA, the E-Commerce Directive does 
not specifically address the position of search engines.91 
Notice-and-takedown mechanisms on both continents are far from 
perfect; they are often accused of leading toward easy and unquestioned 
removals.92 Abuse is not uncommon and its detrimental effect on 
freedom of expression has been commented on extensively.93 The issues 
 
U.S.C. § 230(c)) and Section 202 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 512). The former applies to defamation, invasion of privacy, tortious interference, 
civil liability for criminal law violations, and general negligence claims based on third-party 
content. The latter has been enacted specifically for copyright infringements. Because the 
focus of this article is on the procedural aspects of notice-and-takedown, we will focus on the 
DMCA regime only. For more on Section 230(c) of the CDA, see David S. Ardia, Free Speech 
Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 452 (2010). 
 90. Limitations on Liability Relating to Material Online, 17 U.S.C § 512(d) (2014). For 
more on the DMCA, see ADAM HOLLAND ET AL., BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 
NOC ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES CASE STUDIES SERIES: INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2015), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/is2015/sites/is2015/images/NOC_ 
United_States_case_study.pdf. 
 91. Search engines fall within the scope of the E-Commerce Directive as a whole, E-
Commerce Directive, supra note 87, at recital 18, but they were not awarded with a specific 
liability exemption. The question of search engines’ liability for third party content was left 
entirely to the discretion of the Member States. For example, Austria and Liechtenstein 
classified these types of services as providers of “access services,” providing them with a 
liability exemption similar to that for the providers of mere conduit services. The underlying 
rationale was that “search engines generally do not edit the content they show in the results, 
are not the source of the information they link to, and are not in the position to remove it from 
the Web.” Joris van Hoboken, Legal Space for Innovative Ordering: On the Need to Update 
Selection Intermediary Liability in the EU, 13 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 9 n.30 (2009). 
Other member states, such as Hungary, Portugal, and Spain, have opted for the hosting model 
for both search engine services and hyperlinking services. Several EU countries left this issue 
unregulated and apply the general rules of tort law. 
 92. See, e.g., Rosa Julia Barceló & Kamiel Koelman, Intermediary Liability in The E-
Commerce Directive: So Far So Good, But It’s Not Enough, 16 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY 
REV. 231 (2000); THIBAULT VERBIEST ET AL., STUDY ON THE LIABILITY OF INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/ 
final_report_en.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
ROLE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 49 n.83 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/internet/ 
ieconomy/44949023.pdf; Jennifer Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Processes or Chilling 
Effects? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006); Unintended Consequences: Fifteen 
Years Under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/pages/unintended-consequences-fifteen-years-under-dmca. 
 93. See JENNIFER URBAN & LAURA QUILTER, EFFICIENT PROCESS OR “CHILLING 
EFFECTS”? TAKE-DOWN NOTICES UNDER SECTION 512 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 
COPYRIGHT ACT: SUMMARY REPORT (2006), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Chilling 
_Effects_Report.pdf; Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: 
Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010). See 
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are a direct result of policymakers pushing Internet intermediaries into a 
role of gatekeepers, responsible for policing content online. Both in the 
EU and the U.S., the flaws of takedown procedures have led to 
discussions on potential improvements to the current system.94 
It is important to highlight that Google Spain was not based on (nor 
did it even reference) the E-Commerce Directive. The CJEU considered 
that Google should be held liable for its own wrongdoings (failing to 
accommodate the data subject’s rights), not for the actions of the third 
party (the publisher La Vanguardia) over which Google had no control. 
Therefore, the ruling was based entirely on the primary responsibility of 
Google under data protection law (Data Protection Directive 95/46).95 
Nonetheless, the ruling effectively led to the creation of a complaint-
based system, which closely resembles the notice-and-takedown 
procedure.96 We refer to this new hybrid mechanism as “notice-and-
delist.” 
C. Not So Different After All 
Notice-and-takedown and notice-and-delist procedures display 
strong similarities. Nevertheless, they are not completely analogous.97 
The two regimes differ both in scope and outcome. Notice-and-takedown 
targets illegal content or activities of third parties. Notice-and-delist 
relates to the autonomous and independent activity of the search engine 
itself: linking a search term with a result. Notice-and-delist applies 
regardless of the (il)legal nature of the original publication.98 A refusal to 
honor a notice-and-takedown request could lead to the service provider’s 
liability for non-action towards the third party’s infringement. Ignoring a 
notice-and-delist request could amount to the search engine’s liability for 
its own actions.99 
 
also LUMEN DATABASE, https://lumendatabase.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (“collects and 
analyzes legal complaints and requests for removal of online materials”). 
 94. URS GASSER & WOLFGANG SCHULZ, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 
GOVERNANCE OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES: OBSERVATIONS FROM A SERIES OF NATIONAL 
CASE STUDIES (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2566364. 
 95. The CJEU did not assess the applicability of the E-Commerce Directive to search 
engines, nor did it address the relationship between the E-Commerce Directive and the Data 
Protection Directive. For the full discussion, see Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra 
note 7, at 60–62. 
 96. See Stavroula Karapapa & Maurizio Borghi, Search Engine Liability for 
Autocomplete Suggestions: Personality, Privacy and the Power of the Algorithm, 23 INT’L J.L. 
& INFO. TECH. 261, 261–289, 283 (2015). 
 97. They are, after all, based on different legal frameworks: the E-Commerce Directive, 
supra note 87, and the Data Protection Directive, supra note 8. 
 98. Generally the original content will be legal(ly published). Delisting is not concerned 
with the source content, but only with the justification for linking that content to a specific 
individual. 
 99. See Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra note 7, at 9–27. 
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Despite the differences, the two mechanisms present a strong 
conceptual kinship. In both cases, private entities whose rights have been 
infringed can address a service provider directly, requesting that the 
content no longer appear in the context of the provided service. For the 
sake of efficiency, involvement of public bodies is not required, though 
not excluded either. In both procedures, a court or other competent 
public body might join the proceedings, especially if the initial request is 
not honored. In both cases, it is the service provider’s responsibility to 
assess the validity of the request (e.g., determining whether it comes 
from the eligible party). Next, the service provider must examine the 
contested material and decide whether to accommodate the request. A 
refusal to honor the request, in both cases, might result in liability of the 
service provider. In the search for procedural safeguards for notice-and-
delist, it is therefore worth drawing from past experiences in the notice-
and-takedown context. 
 
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Addressing the procedural aspects of notice-and-delist does not 
require reinventing the wheel. A lot can be learned, even if only by 
analogy, from what has been written about notice-and-takedown 
procedures. In our analysis, we refer to the E-Commerce Directive, and 
the DMCA. We also take note of the on-going Notice-and-Action 
Initiative,100 which, inter alia, aims to improve existing takedown 
procedures in the E-Commerce Directive. Finally, we examine the main 
suggestions made in the wake of—and specifically addressing—Google 
Spain.101 The ultimate purpose of this exercise is to test proposed notice-
and-takedown safeguards in the context of delisting and to assess 
whether they could contribute to an adequate implementation of the right 
to be delisted. 
 
 
 
 100. In Europe, the criticism of notice-and-takedown played a major part of the review of 
the E-Commerce Directive. The European Commission focused on the intermediary liability 
regime, specifically on the mechanisms designed to eliminate illegal content from the Internet. 
The mechanisms in the Commission’s initiative are known under the umbrella term “Notice-
and-Action.” See A Coherent Framework for Building Trust in the Digital Single Market for 
E-Commerce and Online Services, at 13 n.49, COM (2011) 942 final (Jan. 11, 2012). 
Currently the review of the intermediary liability regime will most likely be continued as part 
of the Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe. See A Digital Single Market Strategy for 
Europe, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015). 
 101. Particularly those made by the 29WP and in the context of Google’s “Advisory 
Council Report.” See 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 6 n.50. 
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A. Subsidiarity: Start at the Source 
The most straightforward solution to deal with infringing content 
online is to directly request the original publisher delete it. It is also the 
most permanent solution, as removal at the source generally prevents the 
content from reappearing at secondary sources such as search engines.102 
Directly approaching the source would also lead to a more thorough 
assessment. In principle, the publisher is better informed about the 
content and its context than search engines. Publishers can also address 
requests in different ways (e.g., through anonymization or 
pseudonymization), whereas search engines can only delist.103 In the 
context of the Notice-and-Action Initiative it was argued that requiring 
approaching the source first would decrease the number of actual 
requests.104 Subsidiarity, moreover, would significantly lower the burden 
on search engines. With all of this in mind, it may not come as a surprise 
that DPAs, as well as the Council of Europe, suggest approaching the 
source as a useful first step in practice.105 
Though subsidiarity might seem simple in theory, it raises a number 
of practical issues. It may not be clear exactly whom to approach with a 
request and how. The original publisher might be unwilling to cooperate 
or simply ignore requests. Conversely, an easy-to-find and cooperative 
publisher raises another set of issues. Removal or adjustments106 at the 
source will have a more severe impact on the accessibility of that content 
 
 102. Removal at the source does not prevent republication if content had been copied 
before removal. 
 103. The question about the obligations of the original publisher is currently pending at the 
CJEU in the Manni case. See Case C-398/15, Manni, 2015 O.J. (C 354) 20, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/fiche.jsf?id=C;398;15;RP;1;P;1;C2015/0398/P. See also Jef 
Ausloos, CJEU is Asked to Rule on the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Again, TECH., POL’Y & SOC’Y 
(Sept. 18, 2015), https://jefausloos.wordpress.com/2015/09/18/cjeu-is-asked-to-rule-on-the-
right-to-be-forgotten-again/. 
 104. For example, question eleven of the notice-and-action consultation, sub-choice five, 
yes or no response, reads: “A notice should contain evidence that the content provider could 
not be contacted before contacting the hosting service provider or that the content provider was 
contacted first but did not act.” Response of European Digital Rights (EDRi): “Yes.” A Clean 
and Open Internet: Public Consultation on Procedures for Notifying and Acting on Illegal 
Content Hosted by Online Intermediaries, EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS, 
https://edri.org/files/057862048281124912Submission_EDRi_NoticeAction.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2016). 
 105. It has been suggested (though not required) by the French DPA on its website. See 
Comment effacer des informations me concernant sur un moteur de recherché, COMMISSION 
NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTÉS [CNIL] (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/actualite/article/article/comment-effacer-des-informations-me-
concernant-sur-un-moteur-de-recherche/. See also Council, Proposal for a General Data 
Protection Regulation: The Right to Be Forgotten and the Google Judgment, at 7, 2012/0011 
(COD) 11289/14 (Jul. 3, 2014), (memorandum to the Working Group on Information 
Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX)); 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53 (acknowledging 
that individuals may consider approaching the source first). 
 106. For example: anonymization, pseudonymization, or restricting access. 
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than mere delisting. 
Subsidiarity is particularly confusing with regard to the delisting of 
legitimate content. Why approach the source, if the original publication 
was legal and the problem lies with the subsequent processing of 
personal data by a search engine? According to the 29WP, “[i]ndividuals 
are not obliged to contact the original site, either previously or 
simultaneously, in order to exercise their rights towards the search 
engines.”107 After all, publication and subsequent dissemination via 
search engines are two separate processing activities with different legal 
grounds.108 They also have a different impact on the individual’s rights 
and interests.109 In many cases, the individual might not take any issue 
with the original publication, but might not want to be gratuitously linked 
to it on the basis of a mere name-search. This is especially true when the 
source content does not (directly) relate to that individual and/or the 
search results paint a misleading picture of that individual.110 
It is not difficult to see the potential merits of subsidiarity in the 
notice-and-delist context; it seems a fairly straightforward procedural 
safeguard. In practice, however, there are too many factors outside of the 
individual’s control (for example, findability and/or responsiveness of 
the original publisher). Even though subsidiarity might be helpful in 
some cases, it is not a reliable solution to the notice-and-delist 
predicament overall. 
B. Publisher Notification 
Notifying the web publisher ensures its involvement in the delisting 
process. Unlike subsidiarity, publisher notification only grants the 
publisher an auxiliary role. Web publishers may contribute to, but do not 
carry out, the balancing exercise. 
In the notice-and-takedown context, notification is meant to inform 
the publisher about a complaint and give an opportunity to rectify 
potential wrongdoing. Depending on the purpose of notification, the 
 
 107. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 6. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Not long after Google started implementing delisting requests, journalists at the BBC 
and The Guardian received notices that some of their (fairly recent) articles on shady bankers 
and corrupt referees had been delisted. It turned out, however, that the requests did not come 
from the actual subjects of these articles (the articles still showed up when Googling their 
names), but most likely from people who had once left a comment (and otherwise have no 
significant online presence). See Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion: In Europe, the Right 
to Be Forgotten Trumps the Internet., NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion. In Australia, an individual 
also successfully sued Google and Yahoo! (under defamation law) for displaying search results 
in a way that insinuated the requestor was a dangerous criminal. See Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy 
& Ausloos, supra note 7, at 39. 
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timing might be different. If the main goal is to involve the publisher in 
the decision-making process, the notification should be sent before the 
decision is made. Consulting the publisher allows it to provide additional 
context and better assess the request. Receiving more information is 
especially helpful in cases when it is not immediately clear which right 
should prevail. If the purpose is to inform publishers about the outcome 
and/or provide them with an opportunity to appeal, the notification may 
be sent after the decision was made. 
Publisher notification was proposed as a safeguard for ensuring due 
process and the right to freedom of expression during the review process 
of the E-Commerce Directive.111 It was also suggested that, after 
receiving a notification, the original publisher could respond to the 
allegations through a counter-notification.112 Notably, counter-
notification is one of the DMCA safeguards. Section 512(g) states that 
material must be restored ten to fourteen days after the counter-
notification (unless the complainant has filed an action for a court order) 
and defines penalties for misrepresentations.113 
Publisher notifications turned out to be one of the most debated 
issues in the context of delisting procedures. Including the web 
publishers in the process would help to properly balance the rights at 
stake. Publishers, moreover, are in a better position to defend the public 
interest in having access to the information. The 29WP agreed that 
publisher notification prior to the delisting might be helpful in 
particularly difficult cases, “when it is necessary to get a fuller 
understanding about the circumstances of the case.”114 There is no legal 
basis under EU data protection law for routinely notifying publishers 
after decisions have been made.115 
Google’s Advisory Council recommended that search engines 
should notify publishers “to the extent allowed by law.”116 The Council 
argued that notifications should be sent prior to reaching an actual 
delisting decision.117 Currently, Google only notifies web publishers that 
 
 111. See Aleksandra Kuczerawy, Intermediary Liability & Freedom of Expression: Recent 
Developments in the EU Notice & Action Initiative, 31 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 46 (2015). 
 112. However counter-notification was generally advised against in cases when content is 
manifestly illegal. See A Coherent Framework to Boost Confidence in the Digital Single 
Market of E-commerce and Other Online Services, at 45, SEC (2011) 1641 final (Jan. 11, 
2012) [hereinafter Digital Single Market Framework]. See also Kuczerawy, supra note 111, at 
54 n.93. 
 113. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)–(3) (2012). 
 114. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 10. 
 115. Id. Routine communication to publishers might raise additional concerns. Under EU 
data protection law, such activity would require a separate legal basis in order to be considered 
legitimate. Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 7. 
 116. LUCIANO FLORIDI ET AL., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO GOOGLE ON THE 
RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 17 (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/. 
 117. Id. 
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use its Webmaster tool.118 The search engine allegedly only sends 
notifications in just over a quarter of delisting cases.119 This (low) 
number can probably be explained by the fact that a large number of the 
requests concern content on third-party websites (i.e., social networks or 
people search engines).120 Moreover, notifications appear to be issued 
only after delisting, seemingly neglecting its own Advisory Council’s 
recommendations.121 This practice suggests that Google does not intend 
to involve web publishers in the decision-making process. The reason for 
this approach could be that search engines do not recognize a legal right 
of publishers to have their content indexed and/or displayed in a 
particular order.122 Providing a formal and well-structured appeal 
mechanism might encourage publishers to claim “the right to be 
indexed.” 
As mentioned before, ex post notification might still be useful if the 
recipient is afforded an opportunity to appeal the delisting decision. 
Successful appeals have already led to reversal of delisting decisions on 
several occasions.123 Still, actual numbers remain unknown and Google 
does not seem to have a formalized, systematic appeal mechanism in 
place.124 Arguably, even if search engine providers merely inform 
publishers, without allowing for an appeal, the notice still contributes to 
the overall transparency of the process. It may even seem generous of 
Google to ensure that publishers are aware that their content has lost 
visibility. That said, some have labeled the search engine’s notification 
practices as a deliberate attempt to undermine the ruling.125 Its practices 
 
 118. Gibbs, supra note 64. 
 119. Ellen P. Goodman et al., Open Letter to Google from 80 Internet Scholars: Release 
RTBF Compliance Data, MEDIUM (May 13, 2015), https://medium.com/@ellgood/open-letter-
to-google-from-80-internet-scholars-release-rtbf-compliance-data-cbfc6d59f1bd. 
 120. See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, supra note 51. 
 121. See, e.g., Chris Green, Law Firms Exploiting EU ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Ruling to 
Help Individuals Remove Awkward Newspaper Articles from Google, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 17, 
2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/law-firms-exploiting-eu-right-to-be-
forgotten-ruling-to-help-individuals-remove-awkward-newspaper-articles-from-google-
10185164.html. 
 122. See 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53. See also Spanish Delegation, Proposal for a 
General Data Protection Regulation: Chapters III and VIII, 2012/0011 (COD) 7586/15, at 6 
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://statewatch.org/news/2015/apr/eu-council-dp-reg-chap-III-VIII-es-7586-
add-15.pdf (explaining that there is no “right to be indexed” or a “legitimate interest” to be 
indexed). 
 123. Goodman et al., supra note 119. 
 124. Google only offers a form to webmasters who are using the company’s “webmaster 
tools.” EU Privacy Removal, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/webmasters/tools/eu-privacy-
webmaster (last visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
 125. Paul Bernal, Is Google Undermining the ‘Right to be Forgotten’?, CNN, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/07/opinion/bernal-google-undermining-privacy-
ruling/index.html (last updated Jul. 7, 2014, 8:53 AM); Andrew Orlowski, Google De-listing 
of BBC Article ‘Broke UK and Euro Public Interest Laws’ - So WHY Do It?, REGISTER (Jul. 4, 
2014, 12:31 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/04/google_peston_bbc_delisting_not_ 
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could lead to “republication, and ready reidentification, of complainants 
in a way that directly undermines their demand for practical 
obscurity.”126 
In conclusion, publisher notification can play an important role in 
the delisting process. It could act as a due process element and contribute 
to the balancing of rights at stake, including the public interest in 
accessing the information. The results of publisher notification depend 
on the purpose, timing, and implementation of the notification. 
Consulting publishers before delisting might provide additional context 
in difficult cases and contribute to the adequate assessment of requests. 
Notifying the publishers after delisting—particularly when no formal 
appeal procedure is available—does not add much to the opaque 
delisting process. 
C. “Manifestly Illegal” 
One of the biggest difficulties of policing content online is assessing 
whether content (or an activity) is actually illegal. A certain level of legal 
knowledge is required to make decisions on whether or not to take down 
or delist content. Some cases are so complex that even professional 
judges would find them difficult to resolve. Yet, in complaint-based 
systems, private entities are assigned such a role. 
During the E-Commerce Directive review process, various 
stakeholders proposed that intermediaries should only be required to 
remove “manifestly illegal” content.127 Manifest illegality is generally 
understood as a situation where content or an activity is obviously and 
 
compliant_w_public_interest_law_says_expert/ (explaining that in some cases Google was 
accused of organizing a publicity stunt to raise censorship panic among publishers). 
 126. Julia Powles, Why the BBC is Wrong to Republish ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Links, 
GUARDIAN (Jul. 1, 2015, 7:57 AM), http://gu.com/p/4a95x/stw (explaining that the BBC and 
Wikimedia Foundation, among others, have done exactly this). See Neil McIntosh, List of BBC 
Web Pages Which Have Been Removed from Google’s Search Results, BBC: INTERNET BLOG 
(June 25, 2015, 14:40), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/1d765aa8-600b-4f32-
b110-d02fbf7fd379; Nick Summers, Wikimedia Slams ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Ruling, Creates 
Page for Wikipedia Link Removal Notices, NEXT WEB (Aug. 6, 2014, 1:52 PM), 
http://tnw.to/i4rsB. See also Boiten, supra note 64. 
 127. Digital Single Market Framework, supra note 112, at 34–38. See also Patrick Van 
Eecke, Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach, 48 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1455, 1467 (2011); Giovanni Sartor, Providers’ Liabilities in the New EU Data 
Protection Regulation: A Threat to Internet Freedoms?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 3, 7 (2013) 
(arguing that liability should be excluded if a normal reasonable person might consider the 
content as being lawful). Also see Bits of Freedom’s response to the Consultation on Clean 
and Open Internet, Question 16: “if information is unmistakably unlawful and there is a need 
to immediately disable access, the hosting provider can disable access rightaway [sic].” A 
Clean and Open Internet: Public Consultation on Procedures for Notifying and Acting on 
Illegal Content Hosted by Online Intermediaries, BITS OF FREEDOM, 
https://www.bof.nl/live/wp-content/uploads/040912-
submissiontoformofconsultationeuropeancommission.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
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incontestably illegal without the need for further investigation.128 The 
proposed solution has a certain appeal: obvious cases can (and arguably 
should) be dealt with by intermediaries themselves, whereas non-obvious 
cases should be decided by courts or other competent authorities. 
Additional guidance might be derived from L’Oreal v. eBay. In 
L’Oreal v. eBay, the CJEU introduced the standard of “a diligent 
economic operator.”129 The CJEU held that a service provider may lose 
its liability exemption once it is “aware of facts or circumstances on the 
basis of which a diligent economic operator should have identified the 
illegality.”130 This means that the service provider can only be held liable 
if it is sufficiently clear that the content at issue infringes upon the rights 
of others. A similar approach could be adopted when assessing a data 
subject’s rights to delist.131 
Requests for delisting require assessment of the link between 
specific content and a name-search (as opposed to assessing the nature of 
the content itself) and its impact on the individual’s right to privacy. 
While it sounds like a difficult task, Google’s Chief Legal Officer, David 
C. Drummond, acknowledged that the majority of delisting requests are 
easy to solve.132 
The idea that search engines should only be obligated to 
accommodate removal requests in “obvious” cases is not 
unreasonable.133 Under such an approach, search engines would be 
 
 128. For example, in Austria it is considered an “infringement obvious to a non-lawyer 
without further investigation.” [“wenn die Rechtsverletzung auch für einen juristischen Laien 
ohne weitere Nachforschungen offenkundig ist.”] 817 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen 
Protokollen des Nationalrates [Additions to the stenographic minutes of the National 
Assembly] XXI. GP, Zu § 16 EGC 3, at 37 (Nov. 19, 2001), 
https://www.uibk.ac.at/strafrecht/strafrecht/ecgrv.pdf. In Belgium, examples include child 
pornography, revisionism and incontestable defamation. Document parlementaire 
[Parliamentary works] 2002–2003, Doc 50 2100/01, at 48, 
http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/flwb&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcf
m/flwb/flwbn.cfm?lang=N&legislat=50&dossierID=2100; Van Eecke, supra note 127, at 
1467. 
 129. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011 para. 120 
(ECLI:EU:C:2011:474). 
 130. Id.  
 131. But see CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., SHIELDING THE MESSENGERS: PROTECTING 
PLATFORMS FOR EXPRESSION AND INNOVATION (2012), https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-
Intermediary-Liability-2012.pdf (arguing that defamation is too subjective an area of law to 
appropriately apply notice-and-takedown systems given the potential for abuse). Some EU 
Courts have also been reluctant to consider defamatory content as “manifestly illegal” for 
purposes of Article 14. See also VERBIEST ET AL., supra note 92, at 39, 100. Those who argue 
that intermediaries are inept to decide about takedown requests regarding defamatory content, 
are also likely to argue that intermediaries are unable to assess the legality of other content 
harming privacy interests. 
 132. David Drummond, Chief Legal Officer, Google, Address at the Brussels Meeting of 
the Advisory Council to Google on the Right to Be Forgotten (Nov. 4, 2014), 
https://youtu.be/OTAbo3n3BJ8. 
 133. During the hearings of Google’s Advisory Council some experts discussed the idea of 
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required to delist content where it is sufficiently clear that its continued 
referencing under a name-based search constitutes a 
“disproportionate”134 interference with the person’s privacy and data 
protection interests.135 The easy cases should be dealt with by search 
engines directly. Only a subset of requests will require a more thorough 
analysis and could benefit from involvement of DPAs or courts. Search 
engines can be expected to make a good faith effort and not offload their 
responsibility on courts and DPAs. The standard of a reasonable duty of 
care should be used to assess whether Google is taking its responsibility 
seriously. The question, in the end, is about sharing the costs of the 
delisting process. 
D. Independent Body 
In a perfect world, conflicts involving fundamental rights would 
always be decided by a court of law. An impartial judiciary offers the 
strongest warranty that the interests at stake are properly balanced. In 
practice, legal proceedings are costly and time-consuming. Moreover, no 
court system in the world is equipped to handle the volume of requests 
that followed Google Spain. 
During the Advisory Council hearings, several experts 
recommended the creation of a new independent body that would act as 
an external arbiter in resolving delisting requests.136 Inspiration could be 
drawn from alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Although not 
without criticism, the ICANN domain name dispute resolution was 
pointed to as one potential model.137 
Proponents view such independent body or “mediation authority” as 
an arbiter between publishers, search engines, and data subjects. The 
main goal is to ensure adequate balancing of the rights at stake. It is 
therefore recommended that the independent body comprises a wide 
variety of stakeholders, including public and private sector actors as well 
as civil society.138 A balanced composition could help prevent a systemic 
 
defining classes of manifestly unlawful content that would be delisted upon request. See 
FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 116, at 38. 
 134. Or, in the CJEU’s words: “inadequate, irrelevant or excessive.” Case C-131/12 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos, CURIA paras.  92–94 (May 13, 2014) (ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0184. 
 135. Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra note 7, at 70. 
 136. See FLORIDI ET AL, supra note 116, at 36 nn.48, 49. 
 137. See id.; Patrick Van Eecke, Internet Law Professor, U. of Antwerp, Address at the 
Brussels Meeting of the Advisory Council to Google on the Right to Be Forgotten (Nov. 4, 
2014), https://youtu.be/OTAbo3n3BJ8 (at 25:30). For a general criticism of the ICANN model 
see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap & Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute 
Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 191 (2002). 
 138. GLOBAL VOICES, supra note 83. 
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bias toward either free speech or privacy interests.139 At the same time, 
one should remain mindful of the risks involved in the privatization of 
dispute resolution.140 Opinions of the independent body should be based 
on existing laws and case law and not on rules solely created by 
stakeholders. Moreover, recourse to a court of law should always remain 
possible. 
Skeptics expressed concerns as to how such a body would be 
funded.141 The suggestion of charging search engines is appealing but 
immediately raises questions about impartiality and independence. It is 
not unusual, after all, that rules are shaped to cater to the needs of 
patrons.142 Interestingly, in the wake of Google Spain, certain 
stakeholders appeared rather reluctant about the idea of an independent 
body. Some publishers, for example, feared that participation in such 
proceedings would entail considerable overhead.143 Getting entangled in 
another bureaucratic endeavor might not help anyone’s cause. 
The idea of creating a new type of body to mediate delisting 
conflicts is worth considering. When implemented properly, it could 
mitigate significant risks associated with how notice-and-delist is 
currently exercised (e.g., lack of independent tribunal). In order to be 
effective, such a process requires a considerable effort on the part of the 
involved parties, each with different agendas and priorities. With this in 
mind, an independent body set up to deal with delisting requests seems a 
commendable goal in the abstract, but rather infeasible in the short run. 
E. More Transparency 
The lack of transparency in policing content online is a concern 
shared by many.144 During the Notice-and-Action Directive consultation, 
many stakeholders supported the idea of obligatory transparency reports 
on content blocking and removal.145 Providing information (e.g., 
statistics on the types of removed content and the grounds or criteria for 
removal) contributes to a better understanding of the underlying process. 
It might also help reduce the number of abusive takedown notices.146 
So far, it is not a common practice for intermediaries to publish 
information on takedown requests.147 To be fair, Google has been among 
 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet 
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151 (2000). 
 141. See Van Eecke, supra note 137. 
 142. Thornburg, supra note 137, at 213. 
 143. Van Alsenoy & Ausloos, supra note 49. 
 144. See, e.g., Digital Single Market Framework, supra note 112, at 6. 
 145. See Kuczerawy, supra note 111, at 14 n.89. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Rebecca MacKinnon, Where Is Microsoft Bing’s Transparency Report?, GUARDIAN 
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the first to issue general transparency reports on requests to take down 
search results by both government and copyright owners.148 Since 2014, 
Google has regularly published information about delisting requests in 
Europe.149 Apart from some high-level numbers,150 the report also 
includes a limited set of examples on the kinds of requests received.151 
Over half of the examples relate to controversial claimants such as public 
officials or criminals. The Guardian uncovered, however, that not even 
five percent of the requests Google receives actually concern such 
individuals.152 The apparent lack of representativeness, as well the 
limited scope and detail of Google’s current reporting on delisting cases 
prevents drawing any meaningful conclusions.153 
Right after Google Spain’s one-year anniversary, eighty 
academics—from the EU and the US—signed an open letter to Google 
(and other search engines), calling for more granular transparency.154 The 
letter requested the company to release data, in the form of anonymized 
and aggregated statistics, about compliance with notice-and-delist 
requests.155 Still, at this time, Google’s “entire process is silent and 
opaque, with very little public process or understanding of delisting.”156 
Without specific information on how digital platforms such as Google 
exercise their power over information online, many of the issues cannot 
be assessed in detail. The 29WP and Google’s Advisory Council also 
emphasized the need for more transparency.157 Fact-free discussions on 
the right to be delisted are in no one’s interest. The development of 
procedural safeguards in implementing the right to be delisted depends 
 
(Feb. 14, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://gu.com/p/3mmap/stw. 
 148. See Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ 
transparencyreport/ (last visited Mar 21, 2016). 
 149. See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, supra note 51. 
 150. Between June 2014 and August 2015, Google reportedly received over 300,000 
delisting requests, relating to over one million URLs (only 41.5% of which were actually 
delisted). Id. 
 151. For example: “A prominent business person asked us to remove articles about his 
lawsuit against a newspaper. We did not remove the articles from search results.”; “A victim 
of rape asked us to remove a link to a newspaper article about the crime. We have removed the 
page from search results for the individual’s name.” Id. 
 152. Sylvia Tippmann & Julia Powles, Google Accidentally Reveals Data on “Right to be 
Forgotten” Requests, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 9:28 AM), http://gu.com/p/4a9hc/stw. 
 153. Aleksandra Kuczerawy, REVEAL Expert Seminar on the Right to be Forgotten 
(RTBF), REVEAL (July 1, 2015), http://revealproject.eu/reveal-expert-seminar-on-right-to-be-
forgotten/. 
 154. Goodman et al., supra note 119. 
 155. Including, for example, categories of requests/requestors, the proportion for each 
category of successful and unsuccessful delistings, and categories (and corresponding 
proportion) of sources. See id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53; Google Advisory Council, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2016). 
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on information that can only be provided by search engines.158 
CONCLUSION 
Google Spain caught many by surprise. The CJEU unambiguously 
established that search engines are subject to EU data protection law and 
need to consider requests to delist results for specific name-searches. 
How exactly the right should work in practice was left unanswered by 
the Court. Ever since, the road toward implementation has been a bumpy 
one. Google was fairly quick in reacting to the ruling and setting up an 
online delisting form. The Article 29 Working Party issued specific 
guidelines, and media and academics around the world all offered 
suggestions as to how delisting should (or should not) be implemented. 
Still, important questions remain, notably with regard to ensuring due 
process and safeguarding the fundamental right to freedom of expression. 
Taking a step back, it seems that much can be learned from a 
similar, extant framework: the notice-and-takedown mechanism. Despite 
the differences between notice-and-takedown and notice-and-delist, there 
are considerable overlaps when examined from a practical standpoint. 
Hence, the longstanding notice-and-takedown discussions offer valuable 
insights for implementing the right to be delisted. 
This article investigated several recommendations made in the 
context of notice-and-takedown and assessed how they might (or might 
not) contribute to an effective notice-and-delist procedure. First, it 
appears that subsidiarity, though useful in the abstract, will often not be 
viable in practice. Requesting the removal of content at its source 
requires content, or underlying activities, to be illegitimate. Delisting, 
however, is not hinged upon illegality at the source, but rather on the 
further processing by search engines. Second, notifying the original 
publisher only makes sense if they are given the chance to get involved, 
either before (providing context) or after (opportunity to appeal) a 
decision to delist is made. Third, search engines’ obligations (to react to 
delisting requests) must be interpreted within the framework of their 
responsibilities, powers, and capabilities. Whereas search engines can be 
expected to resolve the straightforward cases—the vast majority of 
delisting requests—the harder cases can be referred to (or resolved in 
collaboration with) DPAs or courts. Fourth, installing an independent 
body to adjudicate delisting requests could help mitigate risks of bias in 
 
 158. For example: the (categories of) content that are requested to be delisted; the types of 
individuals that request erasure; the proportion of requests and successful delistings in specific 
categories of content, the proportion of overall requests and successful delistings; the reasons 
for denial and acceptance of delistings; and the proportion of delistings for which the original 
publisher or the relevant data protection authority participated in the decision. See Goodman et 
al., supra note 119. 
FINAL KUCZERAWY AND AUSLOOS 4.5.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/16  11:51 AM 
2016] FROM NOTICE-AND-TAKEDOWN TO NOTICE-AND-DELIST 247 
the delisting process. Establishing such a body would, however, require 
considerable financial investments and a clear commitment on the part of 
participating stakeholders. Finally, the implementation of the right to be 
delisted has largely occurred behind closed doors. More transparency 
(for example, about requests and decision-making procedures) is 
necessary to have a meaningful discussion on the further implementation 
of the right to be delisted. Without sufficient transparency, any attempt at 
moving forward will only take us halfway. 
APPENDIX: CRITERIA FOR DELISTING 
The ruling by the Court of Justice of the EU in Google Spain 
notoriously raised important questions with regard to the protection of 
the fundamental right to freedom of expression. Even though the CJEU 
acknowledged delisting requests require a balancing exercise, its 
articulation of such a balancing test was rather sparse.159 Attempts to 
provide more guidance on how to balance the different rights and 
interests at stake have resulted in the Article 29 Working Party 
publishing its own guidelines,160 and Google putting together an 
“Advisory Council.”161 Taking a step back from initiatives specifically 
focusing on Google Spain, much can be learned from other sources,  
particularly European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) case law.162 
Drawing from all this, we developed a framework and list of criteria (or 
categories of criteria) that inform the application of the balancing test 
prescribed by the CJEU. This list is not hierarchical and conflicts 
between different criteria may arise in individual cases. The overall goal 
is to provide a methodological framework to tackle delisting cases. 
Before listing the criteria, it is worth reiterating the (limited) scope 
of the balancing test. All interests involved (i.e., privacy, data protection, 
freedom to receive and impart information), need to be assessed in light 
of having a specific webpage referred to on the basis of a name search. It 
is important to clearly distinguish this evaluation from, for example, 
assessing the public interest in accessing the information altogether.163 
 
 159. See Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA paras. 81, 93 (May 13, 2014) 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
:62012CJ0131. 
 160. See 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53. 
 161. See Google Advisory Council, supra note 49.  
 162. See Stijn Smet, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human Rights in 
Conflict, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 183, 200 (2010). 
 163. For an elaborate list of what might be in the public’s interest, see JOINT COMMITTEE 
ON PRIVACY AND INJUNCTIONS, PRIVACY AND INJUNCTIONS: REPORT, TOGETHER WITH 
FORMAL MINUTES, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE AND APPENDICES 16–17, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtprivinj/273/273.pdf (“business of 
government and political conduct; the protection of public health and safety; the fair and 
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The latter will only constitute one of the many factors to be considered. 
Apart from the nature of the original content or its publisher, one will 
also need to look at the nature of the individual whose name is searched. 
Ultimately, it will be the connection between the name (search term) and 
the information (search result) that needs to be evaluated for being (still) 
relevant, adequate, and non-excessive.164 
A. Nature of the Source 
1. Nature of the information 
One of the criteria explicitly mentioned in Google Spain, relates to 
the “nature of the information in question.”165 Relevant factors include: 
 
• Factual accuracy166: Is the information up-to-date?167 Is it 
complete?168 If information is false—to the extent this can 
reasonably be verified—it weighs in favor of delisting.169 
• Can the information be qualified as hate speech, slander, libel 
and the like?170 References to publications that are criminally 
prosecutable are more likely to be delisted. 
• Does the information require special protection? This factor 
includes so-called “sensitive data” (article 8 of the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46) which was explicitly referred to by 
 
proper administration of justice; the conduct of the police; cheating and corruption in sport; 
involvement in serious crimes; corporate malpractice; the sympathy of a public figure with 
extremist dogma”). See also Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), 55 E.H.R.R. 15 (2012). In 
ECtHR case law, “[t]he public’s ‘right’ to receive information falls under the general interest 
criterion because it involves a ‘right’ that is assigned to the entire population in abstract terms 
and is thus more akin to a general interest than to a fundamental or human right.” Smet, supra 
note 162, at 221 n.151. 
 164. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at paras. 92–93  
 165. Id. at para. 81. 
 166. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 15 (criterion 4); FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 116, 
at 10, 12. 
 167. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 18 (criterion 7). 
 168. Put differently, does the information give an accurate representation or is certain 
information (deliberately) omitted? Id. at 15 (criterion 4). 
 169. This might also be concluded from ECtHR case law, conferring less protection to 
reputation-harming factual allegations lacking proof. Smet, supra note 162, at 234–235; see 
also Rb. Amsterdam 12 februari 2015, NJF 2015, 173 ([eiser]/Google Inc.) (Neth.) 
(ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:716) (one of the first post-Google Spain rulings, in which an 
Amsterdam Court claimed that delisting is more likely when the underlying information is not 
one of formal reporting, but rather a “ranting”). 
 170. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 16–17 (criterion 5(b)); see also RESEARCH 
DIVISION, INTERNET: CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, EUR. CT. 
H.R. 17 (2015), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_internet_ENG.pdf 
(explaining that freedom of expression does not protect “speech advocating racial 
discrimination and hatred, regardless of the medium used”). 
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the CJEU.171 Beyond the types of data narrowly defined to be 
“sensitive,” other categories might also benefit from a more 
protective regime.172 This would include, for example, 
“biometric data, genetic information, communication data, 
location data”173 or information that “creates significant risks of 
identity theft, financial fraud, or other specific harms.”174 
Generally speaking, links to these kinds of information should 
more readily be delisted. 
• Does the information relate to a criminal offense?175 Many 
examples exist of ex-convicts trying to escape the cloak of their 
past by having (links to) online information removed.176 Indeed, 
many laws—on both sides of the Atlantic—specifically target 
the expunging of criminal records in order to facilitate 
reintegration.177 Generally, removal or delisting of this kind of 
information will be a function of time (see infra). But, the 
severity of the crime, national legislation on the availability of 
such information,178 and whether or not the person has been 
 
 171. Data Protection Directive 95/46 discusses “data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life.” Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at 
art. 8(1). This is also how the 29WP explained the criterion in its guidelines. 29WP Guidelines, 
supra note 53, at 17 (criterion 6). 
 172. The ECtHR also emphasized that the type of content appearing in a photograph, for 
example, can play an important role as well. See Mosley v. United Kingdom, 53 E.H.R.R. 30, 
para. 115 (2011). 
 173. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation, at 
25 (April 2, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion 
-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf. 
 174. Search Help: Removal Policies, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/ 
answer/2744324 (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (Google’s help page on information removal 
before it implemented its delisting form); see Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra note 
7, at 68. Google’s Advisory Council Report specifically refers to information relating to an 
individual’s intimate or sex life, financial information, private contact or identification, etc. 
See FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 116, at 9–10. 
 175. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 20 (criterion 13); Toobin, supra note 110. 
 176. For example, the Sedlmayer case in Germany. Aurelia Tamò & Damian George, 
Oblivion, Erasure and Forgetting in the Digital Age, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-
COM. L. 71, 78 (2014); See also Hans Graux, Jef Ausloos & Peggy Valcke, The Right to Be 
Forgotten in the Internet Era, ICRI Research Paper No. 11 3–5 (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2174896 (discussing traditional droit a l’oubli cases). 
 177. German courts have recognized that the removal of information might be necessary to 
ensure the individual’s rehabilitation but in one case such removal was denied because the 
individual was imprisoned for life (and thus had no interest in rehabilitating). See Tamò & 
George, supra note 176, at 78. 
 178. In Belgium, for example, the processing of judicial information is prohibited 
altogether (even when the data subject consents). See Elise Defreyne & Romain Robert, 
L’arrêt ‘Google Spain’: Une Clarification de la Responsabilité des Moteurs de Recherche . . . 
Aux Conséquences Encore Floues, 3 REVUE DU DROIT TECHNOLOGIES DE L’INFORMATION 
73, 107 (2015). See also Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel, Google, to 
Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, Chair, Article 29 Working Party (July 31, 2014) (Peter Fleischer, 
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acquitted or released will also be relevant.179 In a ruling shortly 
after Google Spain, for example, an Amsterdam court explained 
delisting links to criminal reporting can only be successful 
when they “reappear for no particular reason other than 
damaging/hurting the individual.”180 
• Can the information be considered political speech?181 If so, it 
constitutes an important factor against delisting.182 An 
important body of ECtHR case law exists in this regard as 
well.183 
• The type and/or format of the information (e.g., audiovisual 
vs. textual material).184 Pictures, arguably, have a bigger impact 
than text, especially when containing faces (and hence can be 
subjected to facial recognition software).185 
 
Google’s European head of privacy, expressing his concerns about the different approaches 
across the EU by attaching the Questionnaire Addressed to Search Engines by the Article 29 
Working Party Regarding the Implementation of the CJEU Ruling on the “Right to Be 
Forgotten” to the letter.). In the allegedly first national delisting case after the CJEU’s 
decision, a Paris Court ruled in favor of the requestor on the basis that the criminal facts did 
not appear in a particular section of that person’s criminal record. Tribunal de grande Instance, 
supra note 62. A Dutch court, on the other hand, ruled against delisting because the underlying 
criminal facts had given rise to a lot of media attention (TV, newspapers, and even the 
inspiration for a book). The Court explained that when a person commits a crime, he/she 
simply needs to accept that this leaves nasty traces, accessible online, maybe even for a very 
long time. Rb. Amsterdam 18 september 2014, NJF 2014, 433 ([eiser]/Google Netherlands 
B.V.) (Neth.) (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:6118). 
 179. In Spain, delisting has proven to be more likely when the person was eventually 
acquitted. See Peguera, supra note 59, at 335–37. 
 180. See id. 
 181. “Political speech” should be interpreted broadly: does the information “come within 
the scope of any public or political debate on a matter of general importance”? INTERNET: 
CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 31. The 
(political) context in which the information is published also plays an important role. MONICA 
MACOVEI, A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 46–48 (2004) (citing Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
407 (1986)). Conversely, publications merely “concentrating on sensational and, at times, lurid 
news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at satisfying the curiosity of a 
particular readership regarding aspects of a person’s strictly private life” do not benefit from 
the same level of protection. See Mosley v. United Kingdom, 53 E.H.R.R. 30, para. 114 
(2011); see also FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 116, at 10–11. 
 182. Toobin, supra note 110. 
 183. See INTERNET: CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
170 (providing a comprehensive overview on balancing the rights to freedom of expression 
with the right to privacy online); see also Smet, supra note 162, at 223 (explaining that the 
ECtHR statements in the context of the public debate benefit from more protection). 
 184. Pictures are said to have a potentially bigger impact than text, especially when 
containing faces (which can be subjected to facial recognition algorithms). Difference in text-
formats might also be relevant (e.g., protected by digital rights management or not). “For a 
private individual, unknown to the public, the publication of a photo may amount to a more 
substantial interference than a written article.” Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), 55 
E.H.R.R. 15, para. 113 (2012). 
 185. See also FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 116, at 10. 
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• The manner in which information was collected.186 Was the 
referenced content collected with or without the data subject’s 
consent and/or knowledge? 
2. Identity of the Publisher 
Apart from the nature of the information itself, the (original) 
publisher’s identity will often constitute an important factor as well. 
 
• Is the information self-published?187 If so, this is generally an 
argument against delisting.188 However, one might also argue 
the exact opposite. After all, if information is published at the 
initiative of the data subject, he/she might also have a claim on 
having it withdrawn or made less accessible.189 
• What is the reputability of the publisher? If anything, the 
Google Spain Case made clear that even links to reputable news 
websites might be delisted.190 Hence, this criterion seems to be 
primarily relevant when the source page is not reputable (e.g., 
revenge porn websites).191 Still, it is safe to say that links 
referring to information published ‘“in the context of 
journalistic purposes,’” are less likely to be delisted.192 
• Is the “source page” a social networking site? Many requests, 
it turns out, relate to third-party websites such as social 
networks or people search engines.193 When the request relates 
to the data subject’s own social network profile, Google 
 
 186. See Von Hannover, 55 E.H.R.R. at para. 113, and the case law cited there. 
 187. For example, when the data subject publishes a “selfie,” blog post, or comment. 
 188. Google reportedly refused over one-fifth of requests (handled through the website 
Reputation VIP) exactly because the requestor is the author of the content. See Infographic: 
How Google Treats “Right To Be Forgotten” Requests?, REPUTATION VIP (September 23, 
2014), http://www.reputationvip.com/blog/infographic-how-google-treat-right-to-be-forgotten-
requests; see also Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 178; Toobin, supra note 110; 
FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 116, at 13. There is also German and French case law in which a 
person’s right to have information removed was denied precisely because he/she made the 
disputed information public before. Tamò & George, supra note 176, at 78. 
 189. This seems to be the position of the Article 29 Working Party. 29WP Guidelines, 
supra note 53, at 19. See also Defreyne & Robert, supra note 178, at 105–106. 
 190. Nonetheless, Google is said to more readily reject delisting requests when the link 
refers to a government website or renowned news organization. REPUTATION VIP, supra note 
188. Google’s head privacy council did state that low barriers for online journalism make it 
increasingly hard to precisely define the latter. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 178; 
see also Toobin, supra note 110. 
 191. Related to this, the ECtHR “has also evaluated the good faith of applicants who made 
allegedly defamatory remarks elsewhere.” Smet, supra note 162, at 228 (emphasis added). 
 192. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 19 (criterion 11); see also FLORIDI ET AL., supra 
note 116, at 13. 
 193. Not ‘traditional media or journalistic news outlets.’ See Google Transparency Report, 
supra note 148. 
FINAL KUCZERAWY AND AUSLOOS 4.5.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/16  11:51 AM 
252 COLO. TECH. L.J. [Vol. 14.2 
reportedly tends to deny the request.194 When the information is 
posted by third parties—and/or outside the individual’s 
control—other criteria must be examined more closely. 
• Does the publisher have a legal obligation to make the 
information public? Though clearly not a determinative factor, 
the 29WP emphasized it still plays an important role in 
evaluating a delisting request.195 Reportedly, Google also looks 
at whether or not the underlying information constitutes 
government data.196 
B. Status of the individual concerned 
Besides the nature of the source, the characteristics of the individual 
also constitute an important element in the required balancing exercise. 
To start with, this individual must be a natural person.197 
 
• Does the individual play a role in public life? This criterion 
was explicitly mentioned by the CJEU as a factor against 
delisting.198 Though this concept is broader than the notion of 
public figures,199 much can be learned from existing doctrine 
and case law on the latter.200 From ECtHR case law on 
balancing privacy versus freedom of expression interests, we 
can deduct a hierarchical list of four categories of public 
figures: (a) democratically elected public officials/candidates;201 
 
 194. After all, the data subject will have the ability to control the level of publicity of 
his/her profile on the social networking site itself. See REPUTATION VIP, supra note 188. 
 195. “However, this will have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, together with the 
criteria of ‘outdatedness’ and irrelevance.” 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 19 (criterion 
12). 
 196. REPUTATION VIP, supra note 188. In Spain, whether or not reference relates to 
information published in an official gazette does not seem to be a determinative factor. 
Peguera, supra note 59, at 333–35. 
 197. Data protection rights (i.e., the right to delist) can only be exercised by natural 
persons. Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 1–2; 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, 
at 13 (criterion 1). 
 198. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA para. 81 (May 13, 2014) 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
:62012CJ0131. 
 199. The 29WP also refers to The Resolution 1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 14–15. 
 200. The notion of “public figure” is dynamic and depends on the context, circumstances 
and jurisdiction in which it is being evaluated. The prior conduct of individuals might play a 
role in this regard. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND INJUNCTIONS, supra note 163, at 
25 (claiming that individuals who actively seek publicity, should also accept a higher threshold 
for delisting). The ECtHR, however, stated that prior cooperation with a publisher or the press 
does not mean an individual cannot be opposed to further publishing of that information. Von 
Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), 55 E.H.R.R. 15, para. 111 (2012). 
 201. MACOVEI, supra note 181, at 45 (discussing the particularly high threshold with 
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(b) other people in public positions; (c) people playing an 
important role in different aspects of public life; (d) people 
whose conduct attracts legitimate attention of public opinion.202 
Privacy expectations (and by extension the likelihood of 
delisting) gradually decline from (d) to (a). But even when the 
requestor qualifies as a public figure, this does not entail a carte 
blanche to refer to any kind of information (see infra).203 
Basically, persons who “willingly and knowingly lay 
themselves open to public scrutiny” have slimmer chances of 
seeing information delisted.204 In its guidelines, the 29WP 
emphasized that ‘public figures,’ “due to their 
functions/commitments, have a degree of media exposure.”205 
Hence, the 29WP continues, a good rule of thumb is to evaluate 
whether denying a delisting request would protect “against 
improper public or professional conduct.” 206 
• Is the data subject a minor?207 This factor is mentioned by the 
29WP and is also explicitly mentioned in Google’s Advisory 
Council Report as a factor in favor of delisting.208 
 
 
 
 
regard to this category of public figures). 
 202. Categories (a)–(c) relate to the person’s professional or social role, whereas (d) 
relates to the person’s behavior or activities. Smet, supra note 162, at 226 (listing (a) 
politicians; (b) public servants (except those mentioned under (c)); (c) public servants engaged 
in law enforcement (e.g., prosecutors and judges); (d) other public figures; (e) private 
individuals). 
 203. ECtHR case law clarifies that “even where a person is known to the general public, 
he or she may rely on a ‘legitimate expectation’ of protection of and respect for his or her 
private life.” Von Hannover, 55 E.H.R.R. at para. 111. 
 204. Smet, supra note 162, at 206. 
 205. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 14–15 (referring to “The Resolution 1165 (1998) 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy”). See also 
Search Result Delisting Criteria, INFO. COMM’RS OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/search-result-delisting-criteria (last visited Jan 22, 2016) (providing the list of 
criteria issued by the UK DPA). 
 206. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 13. 
 207. “In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private 
institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.” Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 10, at art. 24; G.A. Res. 44/25, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 16 (Sept. 2, 1990); 29WP Guidelines, supra note 
53, at 3 (providing more references and a thorough explanation of the protection of personal 
data of children in the EU); JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND INJUNCTIONS, supra note 
163, at 25 (addressing the issue of parents exposing information about their children). 
 208. Google Transparency Report, supra note 148 (specifying at least one request has 
been complied with in which the information related to a minor). 
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C. Linking name to information 
After assessing the nature of both the search term and search result, 
we get to the heart of the required balancing exercise (as alluded to by 
the CJEU): evaluating the public interest in linking one to the other.209 
The CJEU refers to several data protection principles that are useful in 
this regard. Put briefly, the link between a name search and webpage 
needs to be fair and lawful, adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to achieving the public interest.210 Finally, the individual’s 
legitimate expectations (on what information will be visible through 
search engines) should also be taken into account.211 
 
• Does the search result relate to the data subject?212 Though 
this criterion might seem self-evident, it is important to 
reiterate. Clearly, referencing information that has no—or only 
a slim—connection to the data subject, is not relevant within the 
meaning of article 6 of the Data Protection Directive. 
Additionally, search engines themselves have a clear incentive 
to only provide links that are relevant. More complex situations 
arise when, for example, the referenced information relates to 
family members of the respective data subject.213 
• Does the information relate to the reason that the individual 
“plays a role in public life”?214 That is, is there an overlap 
between the reason for the individual’s notoriety (e.g., their 
professional life as a doctor, politician, etc.), and the 
information?215 If so, the availability of the information in 
search results becomes more acceptable according to the 
 
 209. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA para.  97 (May 13, 2014) 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
:62011CJ0184. As mentioned before, public interest in either one does not guarantee there 
being a public interest in linking the two, e.g., sensitive family pictures appearing when 
entering the name of a famous person; a newspaper article on tax evasion appearing when 
entering your grandmother’s name when she merely wrote a trivial comment on that webpage. 
 210. Id. at paras. 70–72, 94. 
 211. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 19 (criterion 10(b), tbl.1); RESEARCH DIVISION, 
supra note 170 at 14. 
 212. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 13 (criterion 1, tbl.1). 
 213. According to ECtHR case law, a “public figure must not be exposed to public censure 
on account of cases concerning a member of his family, even if personal data is accessible on 
the Internet.” INTERNET: CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 170, at 16. 
 214. This criterion can be deducted from ECtHR case law. Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2), 55 E.E.H.R. 15, para. 110 (2012); see also 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 14 
(criterion 2, tbl.1) (explicitly stated). 
 215. For example, crimes committed within one’s professional capacity (e.g., financial 
fraud, a botched medical procedure, sexual harassment). Google Transparency Report, supra 
note 148. 
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29WP.216 The ECtHR does recognize, however, that in a limited 
number of situations, professional or business activities can fall 
within the scope of private life (and thus enjoy stronger 
protection).217 
• Does the information relate to an incident in which the data 
subject was a victim? Delisting requests will generally be 
successful when the data subject is a victim of a crime that 
features in search results.218 
• What is the impact of referencing on the data subject? 
Demonstrating a potential and/or disproportionately negative 
impact will generally be an argument in favor of delisting,219 
though certainly not a requirement.220 The individual’s 
legitimate expectations (of what information will be visible 
through search engines) are also important in this regard as 
well.221 Indeed, the publication of information in a medium with 
an a priori limited audience will generate different expectations 
as to the (potential) impact on one’s privacy.222 A useful 
illustration can be found in the Österreicher Rundfunk case, 
where the ECtHR specifically referred to the impact on the 
individual’s ability to reintegrate in society.223 
D. Time and Context 
The final category of criteria relevant for the balancing exercise 
following a delisting request could be dubbed “meta-factors.” Meta-
factors do not necessarily relate to the information or individuals 
directly. Instead, they constitute the circumstances in which the other 
 
 216. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 15–16 (criterion 1, tbl.1). The 29WP does specify 
in criterion 5(a) that one should also check whether the data subject is “still engaged in the 
same professional activity.” Id. 
 217. INTERNET: CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
170, at 8 (citing Niemietz v. Germany, 16 E.H.R.R. 97, para. 29 (1992); Halford v. U.K., 24 
E.H.R.R. 523, para. 42 (1997)). See also Defreyne & Robert, supra note 178, at 105. 
 218. See also Google Transparency Report, supra note 148. 
 219. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 18 (criterion 8–9, tbl.1). This might also be the 
case, for example, when search results put the data subject at risk, (e.g., for identity theft or 
stalking). 
 220. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, CURIA para. 96 (May 13, 2014) 
(ECLI:EU:C:2014:317), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX 
:62011CJ0184. 
 221. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 19 (criterion 10(b), tbl.1); see also INTERNET: 
CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 14; Case C-
101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-13025. Delisting evaluations might also depend on the 
level of (perceived) “intrusiveness” of search results. Put differently, how “private” is the 
matter by common standards? 
 222. Smet, supra note 162, at 200. 
 223. Defreyne & Robert, supra note 178, at 106. 
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criteria manifest themselves. The meta-factor of time, in particular, can 
be understood as a scale on which the above-mentioned criteria can be 
projected. 
 
• The role of time.224 The importance of virtually all criteria 
mentioned before will evolve over time.225 Though interesting 
as thought-experiments, attempts at creating a methodology for 
applying time as a factor largely remain unsuccessful.226 What 
can be said, however, is that the balancing exercise will have to 
be made at the time of the request.227 This might weigh either in 
favor or against a delisting request.228 In its guiding criteria for 
assessing delisting requests, the 29WP explicitly refers to time 
on several occasions. Most importantly, it does so when the 
underlying data is not up-to-date anymore229 or relates to 
criminal facts. In the latter case, a lot will depend on the timing 
prescribed in local regulations on rehabilitation and/or 
prescription.230 
 
 224. See Paulan Korenhof et al., Timing the Right to Be Forgotten: A Study into “Time” as 
a Factor in Deciding About Retention or Erasure of Data, in 20 LAW, GOVERNANCE AND  
TECHNOLOGY SERIES: REFORMING EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 171 (Serge Gutwirth, 
Ronald Leenes & Paul De Hert eds., 2015) (including a more elaborate study of the role of 
time with regard to the right to be forgotten debate more broadly). 
 225. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at para. 93. See Jef Ausloos, 
The Right to Be Forgotten - It’s about Time, or Is It?, TECH, POL’Y & SOC’Y (Jan. 24, 2014), 
https://jefausloos.wordpress.com/2014/01/24/the-right-to-be-forgotten-its-about-time-or-is-it/. 
This article includes a concise overview of how time impacts data protection principles. 
 226. See Korenhof et al., supra note 224; FLORIDI ET AL., supra note 116, at 14. 
 227. Case C-131/12 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), at paras. 94, 96, 99. 
 228. One ECtHR case, for example, concerned the publication of a book containing 
confidential information by the doctor of former French president Mitterand, just after the 
Mitterand died. Here the court ruled “the more time that elapsed, the more the public interest 
in discussion of the history of President Mitterrand’s two terms of office prevailed over the 
requirements of protecting the President’s rights with regard to medical confidentiality.” 
Editions Plon v. France, 42 E.H.R.R. 36, para. 53 (2004). See also Flux v. Moldova, 50 
E.H.R.R. 34, para. 35 (2007) (explaining that any damage done to the plaintiff’s reputation had 
“substantially diminished with the passage of time”); Smet, supra note 162, at 217; 
Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 13 (emphasizing that the lapse of 
time since a conviction and release constitutes an important element in favor of an individual’s 
privacy interests when weighing it against the public’s interest in publication). One of the first 
post-Google Spain rulings by a Dutch Court denied a right to be delisted, inter alia on the 
basis that the events referred to when searching for the individual’s name only occurred less 
than three years before. See Youssef Fouad, Netherlands: Court Rules on Right to Be Delisted 
from Search Engines, 4 IRIS 19 (2015). 
 229. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 18 (criterion 7, tbl.1). In many cases this criterion 
will cover an issue of “decontextualisation,” as certain information might not be presented in 
its “original” context at the time of original publication. See C. de Terwagne, ‘Droit à l’oubli 
ou droit à l’autodétermination informationnelle?’, in D. Dechenaud, Le droit à l’oubli, 
Recherche effectuée pour la Mission de recherche Droit et Justice 19 (2014). See also 
Defreyne & Robert, supra note 178, at 106–7. 
 230. 29WP Guidelines, supra note 53, at 20 (criterion 13, tbl.1). See also Google 
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• Design and contextual elements. This rather hard-to-define 
criterion can be drawn from existing case law in related areas. 
In two Australian cases, a court ruled that search engines caused 
reputational harm, independently from the original source.231  
The court came to this conclusion because of the way the search 
engines organized and displayed snippets and pictures of the 
individual concerned (creating the impression he was a 
criminal). Conversely, in a German case, the design and 
infrastructure of a teacher-rating website was actively taken into 
account to dismiss a duty to remove certain information.232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transparency Report, supra note 148. (“A man asked that we remove a link to a news 
summary of a local magistrate’s decisions that included the man’s guilty verdict. Under the 
UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, this conviction has been spent. We have removed the 
page from search results for his name.”). 
 231. Trkulja v Google, Inc [No 5] [2012] VSC 533 (Austl.); Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc [2012] 
VSC 88 (Austl.). See Van Alsenoy, Kuczerawy & Ausloos, supra note 7, at 39–40. 
 232. Tamò & George, supra note 176, at 79. The court ruled that the website was designed 
in a manner that prevented libelous statements. 
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